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This thesis contends that Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence would be more 
effective in the Global War on Terrorism if they were more integrated.   Navy and 
Marine Corps Intelligence integration should bring Sailors and Marines together in all 
aspects of warfare to conduct coordinated intelligence.   
This does not imply that Sailors and Marines should be unified into one force.  In 
fact, it is the unique skills of each service that make them indispensable to the other.   
Naval Intelligence provides the large scale team of professionals, the robust onboard 
systems, and communications, and the air intelligence/targeteering expertise.  The Marine 
Corps provides detailed human intelligence in austere, anti-access environments. 
Designed for highly accurate targeting and raids ashore, Marine Corps intelligence can 
provide the timely, accurate, and relevant intelligence needed to fight the global war on 
terrorism for Expeditionary Strike Groups, Carrier Strike Groups, and even Surface 
Action Groups.   
The Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations calls for further integration 
from both the Navy and the Marine Corps.  As Sea Power 21 and Marine Corps Strategy 
21 merge into Naval Power 21, the need for further Navy and Marine Corps integration 
becomes clear.  This will challenge current organizational mindsets.  Nevertheless, sea 
based Sailors and Marines will have to be able to operate side by side seamlessly in order 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
A. INTEGRATION   
Intelligence has always played a key role in U.S. military operations.  The Navy 
and the Marine Corps have served their respective operators well in the past as separate 
elements.  With the advent of the Global War on Terror, however, the needs of the nation 
have changed dramatically.  Only an integrated Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence 
Team can effectively respond to the challenges of this new war.  VADM Jacoby states, 
“There should be no stovepipes in Intelligence – collaboration is the greatest combat 
multiplier we have today, and our intelligence professionals must be prepared to operate 
jointly.”1
The Naval Operational Concept for Joint Operations clearly states that there is an 
ongoing need for further Navy and Marine Corps integration in order to develop more 
effective warfighting concepts, doctrine, and capabilities to meet the threats of the 21st 
Century.  The merging of Sea Power 21 and Marine Corps Strategy 21 into Naval Power 
21 is one such effort to unify strategy.  Naval Power 21 will clearly outline how the 
services can fight more effectively as an integrated team to meet the threats of the 21st 
Century.2
Currently, the Navy can use a constellation of national and theater sensors to 
collect and analyze large-scale troop movements, airfields, SAM systems, and other fixed 
targets as was proven in the last gulf war.  Terrorist cells, however, can remain concealed 
from traditional national sensors.   Terrorist cells hidden under jungle canopies and in 
urban areas, for example, could elude detection and be resistant to aerial attack.   
The Marine Corps has intelligence units available to collect intelligence ashore.  
Reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) teams and HUMINT Exploitation Teams (HETs) 
are trained to go in advance of a Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) to ensure the 
 
1  VADM L.E. Jacoby. “Keys to the Future of Defense Intelligence”.  Intelligence Community Notes.  
(Jan 2004):  2. 
2  U.S. Department of the Navy, Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations.  (Washington DC, 




                                                
security of the landing zones.3  R&S can collect on smaller scale ground activity, but the 
Marine Corps has limitations as to the availability of systems on the ground to 
disseminate the intelligence collected.  Marine Corps Intelligence on the ground also has 
limitations as to connectivity with national assets and intelligence that may be relevant to 
the operation.  In addition, a sea based, FORCEnetted force would limit the size and 
number of intelligence systems needed ashore.  
An integrated Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Team would serve to improve 
the overall capabilities of both services.  The Navy would benefit from ground-based 
intelligence for strikes in jungle or urban environments for example.  The Marine Corps 
would benefit from the Navy’s more sophisticated onboard system connectivity with 
linked communications to forces ashore.  As Naval Power 21 concepts such as Sea 
Basing and FORCEnet become the new way of waging war, the need for Navy and 
Marine Corps Intelligence integration is all the more urgent. 
The objective of Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Integration is to provide the 
best possible product to the warfighter.  The goal of integration should be the 
optimization of combined arms warfare in a conflict by bringing together the skills 
provided by each service.  The right mixture of intelligence can provide the warfighter 
the intelligence he or she needs to strike the right target at the right time with the right 
weapon while defending his or her force from counterattack.  Knowing what resource is 
best for the particular mission is a part of the training that is required.  This training is 
valuable for Navy and Marine Corps integration, but also within a joint force structure.   
B. INTEGRATION NOT UNIFICATION 
Integration in this context means a unity of effort towards accomplishing the 
specific mission.  This does not imply that Sailors and Marines should be merged into 
one service.  On the contrary, it is the unique skill sets of each service that allow them to 
work so well as a team.  Naval Intelligence’s skills with seaborne threats, shipboard 
systems, and coordination with theater and national assets are complemented perfectly by 
the Marine Corps’ skills with ground-based reconnaissance and surveillance, human 
intelligence, and counterintelligence.   
 
3  LtCol Michael Groen, USMC. “Blue Diamond Intelligence:  Division-Level Intelligence 




Ideally, there should be no attempts to mimic the other service or to duplicate 
efforts.  Integration only requires training and understanding on how the other service 
operates and what they can bring to the overall mission.  Leave the skill sets with the 
respective service, but bring those service members together in the various shipboard 
intelligence centers for planning, briefing, and analysis.  Additionally, integrate staffs 
ashore with interservice exchanges of personnel.  Such integration concepts should be 
introduced early in a service member’s career.  The Navy and the Marine Corps as well 




























































II. CURRENT INTELLIGENCE ALIGNMENTS 
 
A. NAVAL INTELLIGENCE 
 1. Fusion Analysis 
Naval Intelligence interfaces with various national and theater level assets to 
produce a tailored, useful product to the warfighter.  This is not easy.  There are volumes 
of information available to the intelligence professional aboard ships today ranging from 
raw data to refined analysis.  The information routinely is contradictory, inaccurate, or 
simply incomplete.  Even with the introduction of data mining tools and intelligent search 
agents, the analysis of this information by an experienced intelligence officer or 
intelligence specialist is essential onboard a deployed vessel.  Working in coordination 
with FORCEnetted systems, the intelligence professional is capable of finding the 
relevant and accurate information that he or she can translate into useful intelligence for 
operations. 
 The challenge of this process is more understandable when it becomes clear how 
much information and intelligence is available.  JWICS, SIPRNET, GCCS-M, and 
NIPRNET provide information from various national agencies, theater assets, joint 
intelligence centers, news sources, and organic (platform-based) collection systems.   
Intelligence can take many forms as well.  They are based on their means of 
collection.  The intelligence professional can conduct all-source fusion analysis to 
evaluate intelligence reports for their validity and relevancy to the operator.  Although 
this process can be time consuming now, new human-systems interfaces and data mining 
tools will enhance the speed of the analysis by providing more relevant and refined 
information to the unit analyst.  The resulting intelligence is invaluable to the conduct of 
operations.  Even with the dangers of being overloaded with raw data, it is still better to 
have a broader range of information available to make analytical determinations and 
predictions.   
The Navy is currently developing and fielding a unique system to integrate 
sensors, weapons, warriors, platforms, command and control, and networks together in a 




                                                
system is called FORCEnet.  CVs, CVNs, LCCs, LHDs, and LHAs will have a fully 
staffed and fully FORCEnetted intelligence center onboard from which they can provide 
the intelligence needed for an operation or campaign.  These systems will be connected to 
theater and national assets using advanced, digital communications.  Shipboard Challenge 
Athena communications and the Global Broadcast Network (GBN) receive high data 
rates from the Automated Digital Network System (ADNS) via satellite.4
2. Carrier Strike Group Intelligence   
Naval Intelligence support to operations traditionally has taken on several forms.  
The majority of emphasis for Naval Intelligence has recently been in support of strike 
warfare.  Intelligence professionals, Intelligence Officers and Intelligence Specialists are 
assigned to carrier airwings (CVWs) to provide accurate intelligence to Naval Aviators 
for mission planning purposes using all-source fusion analysis.  CVW intelligence briefs 
threats to the mission, debriefs returning pilots for intelligence data, continuously updates 
the strike plot, and provides target intelligence.  Bomb hit assessments are then sent out 
to the theater intelligence center for analysis. 
The Carrier Strike Group (CSG) staff has an N2 and an assistant N2.  The CSG 
N2’s primary responsibility is to the CSG Admiral and to all the components of his or her 
CSG.  This N2 provides a full spectrum of intelligence from tactical intelligence for the 
CSG to force protection intelligence for CSG vessels for port calls.   
Finally, the carrier intelligence team operates the Carrier Intelligence Center 
(CVIC).  This team provides intelligence for the carrier’s commanding officer, maintains 
the spaces inside CVIC, and provides secure systems connectivity for CVIC.   
Each component of the CSG has worked well together over the years.  As these 
units are integrated into FORCEnet, the more effective the intelligence will be provided 
to the warfighters.  FORCEnet stands ready to transform the process. 
3. Expeditionary Strike Group Intelligence   
The Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) represents a new concept for the Navy and 
the Marine Corps.  The Expeditionary Strike Group takes the primary three ships in the 
Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), which are the LHA or LHD, the LPD, and the LSD, 
 




and augments them with a CG, a DDG, an FFG or DD, and an SSN.  Although this force 
structure has been used in the past, the means by which they will be employed will truly 
be innovative.  The result will be a combined arms platform capable of accomplishing an 
additional range missions beyond the ARG alone. 
In the ARG, Navy and Marine Corps intelligence could work separately.  The 
Marine Corps only used the amphibious vessels as a platform from which to enter a fully 
accessible theater of operations to embark onto land.  Once there, Navy and Marine 
Corps operations would essentially be separate.  The Marine Corps would handle the land 
campaign as the Commander, Landing Force (CLF) while the Navy would manage 
threats to the ARG ships as the Commander, Amphibious Task Force (CATF).   
The ESG does not represent business as usual for either the Navy or the Marine 
Corps.  In order for key concepts of Naval Power 21 to be realized, the Navy and the 
Marine Corps must integrate more fully.  Nowhere is Navy and Marine Corps 
Intelligence integration more essential than in the ESG.   
4. Surface Action Groups and SSGNs 
In addition to CSGs and ESGs, Naval Intelligence extends out to Surface Action 
Groups (SAGs) and will extend to SSGNs.  Naval Intelligence is vital to the effective 
execution of Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIOs).  Intelligence on the cargo and 
crew of merchant vessels is essential now more than ever during the Global War on 
Terrorism.  Intelligence Specialists on surface combatants, designated as 3905s, currently 
support these operations.  MIOs may present another opportunity to bring Navy and 
Marine Corps Intelligence personnel together.  Marines could be used to augment SEAL 
teams in performing MIOs on opposed boardings. 
 SAGs and SSGNs in the future require extensive targeting intelligence for TLAM 
strikes ashore.  As SAGs and SSGNs move to support ground forces ashore, Navy and 
Marine Corps integration is essential to prevent blue on blue engagements and accurately 
target enemy units in the vicinity of blue forces.   
5. Challenges to Naval Intelligence   
The traditional intelligence cycle has successfully supported strike warfare for 
decades aboard carriers.  It proved itself once again in OEF and OIF.  In the rocky, desert 




effective in acquiring targets.  Theater UAVs also augmented collection efforts.  
Although this was sufficient intelligence support for the air campaigns in both wars, 
ground forces were still needed to conduct the subterranean and urban searches. 
The Global War on Terror will challenge current intelligence cycles.  This new 
war may take our forces to different regions of the world with different terrains.  Regions 
covered with jungles, forests, swamps, caves, and large urban environments provide 
challenges for both intelligence collection and analysis for strikes and raids ashore.   
For example, primitive terrorist encampments in tropical jungles would be hard to 
detect.  They are hard to image or penetrate using active sensors.  Currently micro UAVs, 
unattended ground sensors (UGS), and Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs) are being 
developed to explore and penetrate austere environments around the world.  Until these 
sensors are fielded in greater numbers in the future, however, human intelligence remains 
the single most effective means of collection.   
Small terrorist encampments would require highly precise air strikes or raids to be 
effective.  Accurate intelligence from R&S units becomes indispensable.  National 
intelligence can currently draw attention to these threats.  They can then pass off more 
detailed intelligence collection to military assets and bring the level of accuracy needed 
for a precision strike or raid.   
On the other end of the spectrum, the Global War on Terrorism may take U.S. 
forces into the urban environments of the world.  The urban environment offers plenty of 
hiding places for terrorist cells surrounded by innocent bystanders, hospitals, mosques, 
churches, and non-governmental organizations.   The urban environment also offers 
terrorists connectivity with the Internet, cell phones, and telephone lines.  A terrorist that 
relocates regularly can avoid detection in the near term.  The Internet has thousands of 
chat rooms and encoded sites from which terrorist cells can communicate and coordinate 
attacks.   
Urban environments around the world offer some of the most challenging military 
targets.  For the Navy, smaller, more precise weapons may be the answer.  However, the 
extensive detail of the intelligence needed for these types of attacks also requires 
HUMINT in combination with future micro-UAVs, SIGINT, and perhaps OSINT 




                                                
B MARINE CORPS INTELLIGENCE 
1. MAGTF Intelligence   
The primary mission of Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) intelligence is 
to support all elements of the MAGTF from the Command Element (CE) down to the 
single Marine on the ground.5  Marine Corps Intelligence provides the Marines on the 
ground with the relevant intelligence those Marines need to conduct their operations 
whether that is a raid or a full-scale assault on the beach.   
Intelligence is collected through reconnaissance on the ground.  These Marine 
Intelligence teams have a variety of organic collectors available to them to collect on 
enemy troop movements.  They can collect on the type of terrain, the enemy order of 
battle, movements of forces using HUMINT Exploitation Teams (HETs), 
Reconnaissance and Surveillance Teams (R&S), and Radio Reconnaissance Teams to 
collect SIGINT on enemy intentions.6
Whether at sea or ashore the Marines rely heavily upon theater and national assets 
for intelligence support.  While at sea, there remains an issue with a redundancy of effort 
with their Navy counterparts in collections and watches.  While ashore, Marine Corps 
Intelligence personnel set up mobile sensitive compartmented information facilities 
(SCIFs) to support their commanders.  A collaborative effort between Navy and Marine 
Corps personnel would keep the command elements at sea and reduce the size of the 
equipment and logistics footprint ashore using FORCEnet and Sea Basing concepts.   
2. Challenges to Marine Corps Intelligence   
Naval transformation remains the primary challenge to the Marine Corps.  Naval 
Power 21’s concepts of Sea Basing and FORCEnet are reshaping the way the Navy and 
Marine Corps fight.  If the Marine Corps is to employ Ship to Objective Maneuver 
(STOM) and Sea Basing in the future, then they will need to review how they perform 
their intelligence support for their commander and coordinate that support at sea.  STOM 
involves the concept of using the naval forces at sea to maneuver ground forces and to 
deliver ship-based artillery and fire support for power projection ashore.  
 
5  U.S. Department of the Navy, Marine Corps Strategy 21, (Washington DC, 2003), 2-3. 




                                                
A sea based MAGTF either at the MEU or MEB size will be able to use the sea as 
a maneuver space using the Naval forces available to them.  Marine Corps Intelligence 
will remain focused upon the ground objectives but integration with the Navy, while sea 
based and FORCEnetted, will facilitate a better intelligence flow of information to and 
from national resources while relaying the tailored relevant intelligence to the dispersed 
forces ashore so they can more effectively collaborate. 
C. CURRENT INTEGRATION SUCCESSES   
1. On the CSG   
Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence has already undertaken several initiatives to 
become more integrated starting with the Navy and Marine Corps staffs at the Pentagon.   
A Marine Corps hornet squadron occasionally augments the CVW.  When this 
happens, the Marine Squadron Intelligence Professionals are fully integrated into the 
CVW intelligence team during work ups.  In fact, airwings that are integrated have found 
Marine Corps Intelligence Professionals to be very beneficial in discussing the ground 
picture for more effective support in the carrier’s strike plot in CVIC.   
In addition, the Marine Corps squadron has benefited from the resources in CVIC 
for strike warfare. 7  In particular, the CVW Targeteer provides invaluable targeting 
intelligence to the Marine Corps squadron.  The Marine Corps squadron benefits from 
this targeting process.  Navy and Marine Corps integration specifies that the Navy 
Targeteer has valuable intelligence to provide to both the Navy and Marine Corps 
squadrons and can do so without compromising his or her support to the Navy.  In fact, 
Targeteer support to the Marine Corps is beneficial to the overall effectiveness of the 
mission.  
CVW intelligence integration goes further.  Naval Intelligence officers are 
assigned to work with Marine Aviators to develop strike planning profiles and processes.  
This integration has paid benefits to both services.  The Navy benefits from Marine Corps 
skills in ground intelligence and intelligence support for close sir support missions and 
the Marine Corps gets to deploy a squadron on the carrier to forward deploy.  The Marine 
Corps also benefits from Naval Intelligence support afloat.   
 
7  Donald R. Bouchoux.  “Navy-Marine Corps TacAir Integration is the Future”.  Proceedings. (Mar 




                                                
2. On the ESG   
On the ESG there also have been a series of intelligence integration successes.  
Navy and Marine Corps Cryptologists, knowing that they have similar skills, have 
decided to integrate manpower and resources together on the LHAs and LHDs to more 
efficiently work duty rotations and eliminate redundancy of effort on the watches. 
The ESG concept has boosted interest in further integration of Navy and Marine 
Corps Intelligence teams afloat.  While the MEU remains at sea, Naval Intelligence can 
support them with their own shipboard systems.   
The Marine Corps’ the Rapid Response Planning Process (R2P2) has served them 
very effectively in past conflicts.  Its thorough planning style is exactly what the Marines 
need for assaults ashore.  The R2P2 process is starting to be adopted by the entire ESG in 
order to support ESG strike operations as a whole using a Navy and Marine Corps team. 8  
Finally, Marine Corps Intelligence is better suited, but not perfect in supporting 
SEAL teams.  The detail provided by the Marine Corps on the ground picture is pertinent 
to the SEAL teams need to plan raids ashore in support of operations.  Currently, a few 
Marine Corps Intelligence units provide some support to deployed SEAL teams. 9  
3. Other Staffs   
Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence has had many successes at integrating at the 
staff level.  Of course military staffs come in all shapes and sizes and missions.  
Numbered Fleet Staffs offer opportunities for Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence 
Professionals to integrate plans and analysis at the operational level of warfare.   
Shore staffs are extremely conducive to an integrated staff environment as well.  
Whether it be for exercises, planning, facility support, or force protection, Navy and 
Marine Corps integrated intelligence staffs can quickly come together to work as a team 




8  LtCol Aldridge, USMC, interview by author, notes, USS Peleliu LHA 5, 25 August 2003. 




                                                
4. Fleet and Joint Intelligence Centers   
For theater level intelligence reporting, Fleet level staffs and Joint Intelligence 
Centers (JICs) are additional venues for Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Integration.  
Here, Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Professionals can work at the strategic level to 
support Naval Operations.   
They can work alongside Army and Air Force Intelligence Professionals at the 
Joint Intelligence Centers to produce intelligence to the warfighters at every level of 
warfare. 10   Service specific skills are still valuable for intelligence preparation of the 






























                                                
III. NAVY AND MARINE CORPS INTELLIGENCE AND NAVAL 
POWER 21 
  
A. CONTINUING INTEGRATION 
Although there have been many successes up and down in the integration process 
for the Navy and the Marine Corps, there are still opportunities for further integration of 
intelligence efforts as Naval Power 21 concepts quickly become a reality for the fleet.  
Naval Power 21 is an integration concept set forth in the Naval Operating Concept for 
Joint Operations (NOC) signed by the CNO and the CMC.  Naval Power 21 is a merging 
of the tenets of Sea Power 21 and Marine Corps Strategy 21.11  The resulting doctrine 
will merge the talents and capabilities of the Navy and the Marine Corps seamlessly in 
the battlespace.   
Intelligence integration needs to take place at all levels of warfare.  Intelligence 
integration afloat for planning, staffing, and coordination should employ a Navy and 
Marine Corps Intelligence Team concept to support the overall, integrated Navy and 
Marine Corps Team.  The resulting team will be able to provide the persistent 
reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence needed for 21st Century warfare. 
B. NAVAL POWER 21 
1. Sea Strike   
Sea Strike is at the core of Naval Power 21.  The tenants of Sea Strike are 
centered around the Navy and the Marine Corps’ ability to project power ashore.  For the 
CSG, this will mean enhanced, precision strike by using ISRT (Intelligence, Surveillance, 
Reconnaissance, and Targeting) capabilities, time-sensitive strike, information 
operations, and ship-to-objective maneuver.12  For the ESG, Sea Strike will mean power 
projection through three different means, from the sea, from the air, and from the land.   
 
11  U.S. Department of the Navy, Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations.  (Washington DC,  
June 2003), i. 
12  U.S. Department of the Navy, The Naval Transformational Roadmap.  (Washington DC, July 




                                                
The goal of Sea Strike and Navy and Marine Corps integration is the optimization 
of combined arms warfare and to improve effectiveness of an integrated force as directed 
by the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps.   
This approach provides more capabilities to the Combatant Commander and more 
options for the President.  These leaders will have the capability through the Navy and 
the Marine Corps to not only strike the right target at the right time, but also be able to 
employ the right weapon for the job.  The right weapon in combined arms warfare 
includes a spectrum from psychological operations up to a 2000lb GPS guided bomb. 
For Sea Strike to be effective, it depends upon actionable intelligence.  Navy and 
Marine Corps intelligence will allow for hyper-accurate strike capabilities to enhance 
time-sensitive, precision strike and to reduce fratricide.  ISRT combines the four 
disciplines together in a seamless and integrated process.  This intelligence will be 
exploited using the Joint Fires Network (JFN).  The JFN will allow for Time-Critical 
Targeting (TCT)/Time-Critical Strike (TCS) by quickly providing targeting data to the 
nearest or most effective shooter.13   
For Marines ashore or embarked on the ESG, FORCEnetted intelligence will 
provide for greatly enhanced combined arms operations including:  close air support, 
surface gunfire support, artillery support, and combat search and rescue (CSAR).   
Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence is able to provide the warfare commander the 
specific and accurate data better together than separately.  Again, on the CSGs, Marine 
Corps Intelligence can provide invaluable ground intelligence for close air support and 
strike warfare.  On the ESG, the Marine Corps can provide even more accurate ground 
intelligence through their R&S teams ashore.  In fact, because of their presence on the 
ground, the ESG can provide more accurate ground intelligence for their organic strikers. 
With the introduction of ship-based unmanned vehicles and their associated 
sensor modules, Naval ISRT will be enhanced dramatically.  Unmanned vehicles will 
include:  unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), 
unmanned surface vehicles (USVs), and unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs).  Each 
 




category of unmanned vehicle will possess different kinds of interchangeable, mission 
specific sensor modules unique to that platform’s capabilities.   
For example, a squadron of UAVs with atmospheric sensor modules deployed 
from the CSG and the ESG can loiter over targets to provide targeting data and real-time 
bomb hit assessments for the warfare commander.  In this way, Navy UAVs at various 
altitudes can provide ISRT to Navy and Marine Corps commanders during a campaign.   
Only organic sensors located on FORCEnetted, unmanned vehicles would provide 
the timely, target specific data that is needed during the Global War on Terrorism.  In the 
sea basing concept, the strike groups will need organic collection assets in order to 
perform their missions most effectively.  Given the requirement to operate in anti-access 
environments, the need for organic assets becomes clear. 
The staff’s Navy and Marine Corps intelligence officers should manage these and 
other ISRT assets.  The intelligence team, through national assets, has the knowledge to 
know where these assets would best be used to exploit enemy critical vulnerabilities.  
Operations Centers should have an intelligence watchstander’s station.  From here 
Intelligence Professionals can direct ISRT assets during a time critical campaign or strike 
for the commander in real time.  Intelligence will also be able to provide situational 
updates to the commander from national or theater intelligence centers.  Again, this 
intelligence station will help augment FORCEnet capabilities.   
This watch station represents a significant step in further integrating intelligence 
with operations.  Both Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence personnel could man this 
station depending upon the operation.  This would allow them to collaborate to 
accomplish the mission at hand.  During a strike or a raid, the leading staff intelligence 
officers from both the Navy and the Marine Corps should occupy this station.  The 
benefits of integrating Navy and the Marine Corps Intelligence with operations will 
become clear as FORCEnet connects forces on the battlefield. 
2. Sea Shield   
Sea Shield is another key element in Naval Power 21.  It involves full 




                                                
group and maintain access in a high threat environment.14  The Department of the Navy 
states that, “Persistent supremacy of the sea and littoral battlespace continues to be at the 
heart of U.S. national strategy.”15  Sea Shield will provide theater and air missile defense, 
littoral sea control, and homeland defense.16  Sea Shield operations within the ESG can 
be conducted in three major areas:  air, surface, and subsurface.   
FORCEnetted integrated intelligence will allow for Sea Shield manned and 
unmanned assets to network and develop a user defined operating picture of the 
surrounding threats to the CSG or ESG using various sensor modules.  For example, 
aircraft, submarines, and surface combatants will be able to share a common integrated 
undersea picture from which the decision maker can more effectively track and prosecute 
enemy submarines.  This would be the same for a common, integrated air picture and a 
common, integrated surface picture.  This process allows for more focused operations 
with the end result being a faster, more accurate elimination of threats to the strike groups 
and protected assets. 
All of these sea shield elements represent information that can be transformed into 
useful intelligence.  This intelligence can provide the commander the best situational 
awareness of the battlespace possible.  This intelligence will be graphically displayed 
within the strike group’s Operations Center.  In the high-tempo war of tomorrow this near 
real-time, accurate intelligence is indispensable to the warfare commander to protect his 
or her forces. 
3. Sea Basing   
“As enemy access to weapons of mass destruction grows, and the availability of 
overseas bases declines, it is compelling both militarily and politically to reduce the 
vulnerability of U.S. forces through expanded use of secure, mobile, networked sea 
bases.”17  Strike Groups can act alone as a small Navy and Marine Corps sea base or it 
can be expanded to include additional strike groups and Maritime Prepositioning Ships 
(MPSs).  Sea Basing allows more effective Sea Strike and Sea Shield capabilities by 
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combining strike groups.  Sea Basing objectives are to accelerate employment time of 
forces and allow for enhanced positioning of joint assets.18
The sea base will be able to expand up to the size necessary to conduct large-scale 
operations from the sea.  Sea Basing multiplies the Sea Strike and Sea Shield capabilities 
of the force using FORCEnet concepts.  Finally, the Sea Basing concept makes it 
essential that further Navy and Marine Corps integration occur.  Integration in logistics, 
fires, intelligence, command and control, force protection, and information operations are 
critical to the effectiveness of the sea base.   
For example, a sea based MEB can be augmented by Navy F/A-18s and EA-6Bs 
for additional striking power and electronic attack.  Navy and Marine Corps special 
operations forces can be tailored and expanded to cover an even broader range of 
missions and targets within the theater of operations.  It is clear that the sea base quickly 
becomes a formidable power projection force, but only if Navy and Marine Corps 
integration continues including intelligence integration. 
Integrated Sea Basing will provide the Combatant Commander a full set of 
flexible response options based upon escalation dominance.  In other words, in case the 
enemy escalates the conflict to the next level, U.S. forces can always top that by bringing 
more forces, more quickly to the campaign than the enemy can possible hope to field.  
This fact alone acts as a powerful deterrence to conflict escalation in future campaigns.  
Sea Basing also provides flexibility in staging large combat forces in support of a 
campaign. 
Sealift represents an essential component to the effectiveness of the Sea Basing 
concept.  Again, Navy and Marine Corps logistical integration is another key to bringing 
about maximum efficiency and subsequent success of the operation.  MPSs, which do not 
have to enter a port to offload supplies, will be able to ferry the right logistics supplies to 
the sea base at the right time in support of the forces at sea and ashore.  “Prepositioned  
ships and surge sealift directly support Marine Corps Assault Echelon and Assault 
Follow-On Echelon operations, as well as Naval Construction Battalion (Seabee) Force 
units.”19   
 





                                                                                                                                                
Sea Basing is the impetus for further Navy and Marine Corps integration and 
intelligence integration.  As Marines remain at sea for resupply, command and control, 
force protection, and operational maneuver from the sea, the need to integrate with the 
Navy’s FORCEnet becomes more urgent.  The resulting integration through FORCEnet 
will be more effective than with the two units working independently. 
For Sea Basing, FORCEnetted integrated intelligence will network the various 
ships of the sea base together not just through user defined interfaces, but through VTCs, 
intranets like the Navy and Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI), collaboration tools, and other 
communication systems that will link together not just operations cells, but the planning 
and intelligence cells of the sea base.  This will allow for staffs and associated planners to 
be located on not just one ship, but dispersed throughout the sea base.20   
4. FORCEnet   
FORCEnet lies at the core of Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence in the 21st 
Century.  FORCEnet is the system of systems that integrates weapons, warriors, sensors, 
networks, command and control, and platforms together.  FORCEnet will develop 
tailored information about the operational environment, network it out on an open 
architecture, and display it to the right decision maker at every level of warfare at the 
right time in a way that he or she can quickly understand it to enhance their knowledge 
and awareness of the operating environment.   
A major component of FORCEnet involves intelligence support that refines and 
analyzes the massive amount of information for the decision maker.  Networking real-
time, accurate intelligence into the process is vital to the commander.  Additionally, the 
need for a user defined intelligence picture employing both Navy and Marine Corps 
Intelligence Professionals needs to take place at all levels of warfare. 
CNO Tasker #65 calls for the integration of Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence, 
but it also goes one step further.  It calls for the horizontal integration of intelligence with 
operations and command and control (C2).  Navy FORCEnet and other Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (OSD) initiatives under VADM Cebrowski, USN (Ret.) are 
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working to shorten the sensor to shooter timeline.21  The FORCEnet concept will 
maintain the decision making advantage during a campaign.  Intelligence professionals 
will be called upon to work along side operators in a near real-time environment.  A 
combined Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Team will have to be accurate and 
relevant within a greatly abbreviated timeline.   
“FORCEnet is the architecture of warriors, sensors, networks, decision aids, and 
supporting systems integrated into a highly adaptive, human-centric, comprehensive 
maritime system that operates from seabed to space, from sea to land.”22  Organic sensors 
on UAVs, UUVs, aircraft, submarines, and ships and non-organic sensors at the theater 
or national level will collect the relevant intelligence for the decision maker. 
As mentioned, FORCEnetted, integrated intelligence is essential to the combined 
sea based operations of the Navy and the Marine Corps.  VADM Jacoby states, 
“Integration of highly skilled intelligence professionals with leading edge technology to 
discover information and create knowledge provides warning, identifies opportunities, 
and delivers overwhelming advantage to our Warfighters, Defense Planners, and Defense 
and National Security policymakers.”23  In Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea Basing 
integrated intelligence will play a key role in supporting the warfighters and the warfare 
commander.  Through ISRT, the JFN, and support from national and theater intelligence 
assets, integrated Navy and Marine Corps intelligence provided to the warfighters will be 
revolutionary in its speed, accuracy, and relevancy.   
Three-dimensional display tools have great potential for bringing together 
cognitively manageable information and intelligence for the analyst.  Various user 
defined screens and displays will provide raw sensor data, all source fusion intelligent 
agents, and the decision maker’s intelligence requirements.   For example, these 
interfaces can provide 3-D cutaways of the ocean, the air, and the ground picture 
including targets, threats, and terrain in either two or three dimensions.   
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User defined interfaces will be used extensively in FORCEnet.  Decision makers 
as well as analysts will have these tools and interfaces available to them to enhance the 
flow of relevant, timely, and accurate intelligence and information throughout the fleet.  
Aircraft, ships, submarines, and ground forces of the strike group will be linked together 
in FORCEnet.  This will allow all members to receive and digest the intelligence that is 
relevant to them regardless of where they are within the battlespace.  Additionally, this 
system would allow for speed of decision and pinpoint accuracy for strikes and 
MEU(SOC) raids inland.   
FORCEnetted, sea based, integrated Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence is 
keeping with the spirit of Naval Power 21.  Additionally, it meets the requirements laid 
out in CNO Tasker #65.  Finally, Navy and Marine Corps intelligence integration puts the 
Navy and Marine Corps Team ahead of the pack to meet Office of the Secretary of 
Defense (OSD) initiatives regarding network-centric operations. 
5. Global Concept of Operations   
Sea Power 21’s Global Concept of Operations develops the concept of having 
various strike groups.  The Navy has created ESGs, CSGs, SSGNs, and SAGs so that the 
total number of available Naval Strike Groups rises to 33 independent strike groups 
instead of 12 Carrier Battlegroups.  This increased presence allows for maximum 
flexibility to the Combatant Commander.  Naval forces will be readily available to 
respond at short notice.   
The Global Concept of Operations allows the Navy and the Marine Corps to 
sustain the 1/4/2/1 U.S. strategic requirement for the armed forces.  This states that forces 
have to be able to provide for homeland defense, provide forward deterrence in four 
theaters, swiftly defeat two aggressors simultaneously, and deliver decisive victory in one 
of those two conflicts.24  This strategy and increase of forces around the globe will 
provide for greater presence but will demand even more timely, relevant, and accurate 
intelligence from both the Navy and the Marine Corps. 
This strategy will require a shift in force structure. As information overload 
becomes more of a problem and the Global War on Terrorism requires fewer forces with 
 




greater intelligence, the demands placed upon Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence 
Professionals is due to increase around the fleet.  An integrated Navy and Marine Corps 
intelligence team would be better suited to meeting the great intelligence demands of the 
post-September 11th world. 
The ESG already has a robust Navy and Marine Corps team onboard.  The CSG 
needs to employ a greater number of Marines for staff, ship, and airwing support.  CSG 
Marine Intelligence could support the ground intelligence picture including better 
intelligence accuracy for combat search and rescue (CSAR) missions.  All strike groups 
would benefit from the intelligence integration process complemented by sensor 
modules.   
6. Sea Trial and Sea Warrior   
Sea Trial is an essential process in integrating the Navy and Marine Corps Team.  
Training is key to unlocking the potential of the integration process.  Navy and Marine 
Corps Intelligence integration is contingent on the right training going to the right people 
at the right time.   Additionally, cultural and service barriers need to come down between 
the Navy and the Marine Corps.  Communication is key to understanding each service 
and being able to fully appreciate what each service can bring to the fight. 
In the 21st Century, the Navy and the Marine Corps Intelligence Professionals 
need to exercise and operate together as one unit in order to most effectively engage in 
combat operations with a single objective.  The Marine Corps, when combined with 
Naval components, represents a large portion of the power projection capability of the sea 
services.   
The Marine Corps already performs the most effective combined arms warfare 
out of any of the services.  Marine Corps Intelligence represents a robust, layered ISR 
collection capability on the ground.  However, they can learn to be better and more 




                                                
Professionals.  CAPT Petra stated, “Combat operations today demand that carrier battle 
groups, amphibious ready groups, and Marine expeditionary units work as effective 
combined-arms teams.”25
Although initial training should remain separate and focused on the needs of each 
service, the Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence pipelines should learn to appreciate the 
combat capabilities of each other while going through basic training, the Naval Academy, 
ROTC, Officer Candidate School, and at the Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence 
Training Center (NMITC).  Once this is established, the Navy and Marine Corps Team 
will understand the greater combat potential found in integrating operations as well as 
intelligence. 
The Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center (NMITC) at Dam Neck, 
Virginia is an excellent venue to begin Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence integration 
initiatives.  New Intelligence Officers and Intelligence Specialists from the Navy and the 
Marine Corps have a unique opportunity to learn from each other and integrate within the 
schoolhouse.  This initial, integrated training at NMITC will have an impact on 
integration in the fleet.   
Again, training at NMITC will still proceed to teach Sailors and Marines the 
specific skills that they require to do their jobs the best at sea and on the ground.  It is this 
sea and ground orientation that is valuable in the integration process.  The integration 
training will focus on getting the Sailors and Marines to work as a team on a staff and in 
the tactical environment.  
The integration of training also needs to educate the Navy about the Marine Corps 
and the Marine Corps about the Navy.  It should cover all areas of operations from 
intelligence to flight deck operations.  Each member should have an appreciation for what 
other members of the team can do for him or her.  Each member of the Navy and Marine 
Corps Team should be encouraged to brainstorm issues in their workspace on how to 
improve interoperability and the integration of effort in the battlespace.   
Exercises are excellent means to enhance classroom training.  Exercises will force 
the team to integrate together to accomplish the mission.  There has been progress on this 
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issue already onboard ESGs through the Rapid Response Planning Process (R2P2).  
Planning together will reinforce the value of integrated efforts.26
Opportunities to cross train personnel should be encouraged.  Tours of duty that 
integrate Marines with Sailors and Sailors with Marines will only add to the further 
appreciation of the people and the skills found in each service.  Staffs at sea and ashore 
should be integrated.  This will encourage a feeling of jointness at even the most junior 
levels of the organizations.  Again, the end result of all of this training is a better 
intelligence product to the operator leading to a more efficient and effective campaign.  
This can be accomplished by pulling the resources and talent of the Navy and the Marine 
Corps Intelligence Team together. 
C. THE FLEET RESPONSE PLAN   
In addition to the Global Concept of Operations, the Fleet Response Plan will also 
require more, trained personnel for sea duty.  The Fleet Response Plan will transform the 
Navy from a regularly deployed force to an employable force.  The CSGs and ESGs will 
become surge ready assets after their maintenance and training phases.  Six to seven 
CSGs will be in a surge capacity at any given time in the Navy.  ESGs will also adopt a 
plan for operations.27   
An integrated and employable Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Team will be 
in even greater demand.  Integrated intelligence teams need to be trained, equipped, and 
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IV. CHALLENGES TO INTEGRATION 
 
A. ORGANIZATION THEORY 
There still remain several institutional barriers to successful Navy and Marine 
Corps Intelligence integration that inhibit the policies laid out by the CNO and the CMC 
in the Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations.28  The reasons behind these barriers 
to a new intelligence doctrine may be best understood by applying organization theory.  
Barry Posen, author of Sources of Military Doctrine, states that, “Organization theory can 
be used to explain organizational behavior wherever we find large, functionally 
specialized bureaucracies.”29  
Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence organizations represent two functionally 
specialized bureaucracies within the larger bureaucracies of the Navy, the Marine Corps, 
the Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense, and ultimately the Executive 
Branch of the U.S. Government.  Power is distributed in organizations to achieve a 
functional specialization.30  These U.S. Government organizations represent some of the 
largest and most powerful organizations in the world with their origins going back to the 
American Revolutionary War.  These organizations have a powerful influence on military 
doctrine and are characteristically slow to transform this doctrine.31
In applying organization theory, the first step will be to outline the casual factors 
within the organization.  Each one of these factors affects the other and explains how 
organizations function.  These are:  purpose, people, and environment.32   
Purpose is the central motivation of an organization.  Without a purpose the 
organization loses focus and ceases to be relevant.  Many organizations redefine their 
purpose, or mission, to match the environment in order to remain relevant.   
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People, usually specialists, work within the organization to fulfill the purpose of 
the organization.  Nevertheless as Posen points out, “While purpose demands rationality, 
people may not be able to provide it.”33   
The environment drives the purpose of the organization.  The environment 
remains ever-changing and uncertain which requires the purpose of the organization to 
adapt to remain relevant in the future.  The environment also presents obstacles for an 
organization to achieve its specified purpose.34  The environmental challenges could be 
physical, economic, political, or intraorganizational. 
A military organization is aware of these casual factors and deals with them by 
reducing internal and external uncertainty through the implementation of procedures and 
policies.35 Internal uncertainty can be reduced by drafting standard operating procedures 
(SOPs) to get people within the organization to function with some degree of uniformity 
towards the defined purpose.  SOPs can be implemented up and down within the 
organization’s hierarchy.  While internal uncertainty will always exist, SOPs do 
effectively manage it within the organization. 
External uncertainty represents a greater challenge to the function of the 
organization and perhaps even its survival.  External uncertainty, or environmental 
uncertainty, includes other organizations and potential enemies around the world.  One 
measure is to protect valued assets from other organizations.36   
Organization theory also suggests that members within the military organization 
remain distrustful of members external to the organization for several reasons.37  The first 
reason is that members within the organization represent the specialists.  People outside 
that organization, in contrast, are not experts and should not be trusted to make effective  
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policy choices for the organization.   Although military organizations remain dependent 
upon the government for their budget, they want to have free rein in deciding where the 
money should be spent. 38  
Military organizations deal with environmental uncertainty from the enemy by 
developing a series of contingency plans by staging and stockpiling various assets to 
quickly and effectively respond to the contingency crisis.  Military organizations prefer 
offensive doctrines because it allows for planning and exercises that attempt to reduce 
uncertainty in future conflicts both internally and externally.  The organization can set the 
tempo of the battle on its own terms from the start.  Secret plans, weapons, and 
intelligence on the enemy all contribute to reducing environmental uncertainty.39  
Offensive doctrines also allow for greater autonomy of the military organization from 
other organizations.   
Organization theory also attempts to explain organizational behavior in regards to 
integration and innovation.  Posen states that, “The setting of priorities among military 
forces and missions is a key aspect of political-military integration.  In multi-service 
military organizations, civilian intervention is critical to the setting of priorities.”40   He 
goes on to state that, “Setting priorities among the services, and among forces or branches 
within services, is a central task of grand strategy.”41  This suggests that if military 
organizations want to retain their autonomy then they should develop doctrine that 
remains consistent with the country’s grand strategy.  Posen argues however that this is 
not likely, “Left to themselves, a group of services cannot make a military doctrine that 
will be well integrated with the political of the state’s grand strategy.”42
According to organizational theory, organizational behavior also inhibits military 
innovation.43  Military organizations are more inclined to change gradually rather than to 
innovate quickly.  SOPs and the delegation of tasks and authority are the backbone to 
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military organizations.  Change and innovation might result in a breakdown of this 
system at the time of a crisis.  As a result, technology alone will not result in a military 
innovation.  However, looking at history, technology successfully demonstrated in a war 
will be more quickly adopted.  Finally, Posen states that, “In multi-service 
establishments, civilians have the possibility, depending on the strategic position of the 
state, of choosing among competing services.”44
Finally, organization theory may be able to offer some approaches to effectively 
reducing institutional friction and barriers to transformation and integration.   
B. THE NAVAL INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION 
Both Naval Intelligence and Marine Corps Intelligence are specific military 
organizations that have developed their own doctrines.  Organization theory can be 
applied in an attempt to better understand their behavior.   
The purpose of Naval Intelligence is to provide intelligence for a specified Naval 
or Joint Taskforce to reduce uncertainty within the battlespace and enhance the decision 
making advantage for U.S. Armed Forces.  Naval Intelligence interfaces with various 
national and theater level assets in its efforts to produce a tailored, useful product to the 
warfighter.   
The people in this organization are Naval Intelligence Professionals comprised of 
Intelligence Officers, Cryptologists, Intelligence Specialists, and Cryptologic 
Technicians.  These professionals remain highly specialized throughout their careers 
within the intelligence organization.  Again as organization theory sets forth, these 
professionals are highly skilled and specialized to accomplish their purpose, but they still 
remain human beings.  As an organization of human beings they seldom approach perfect 
rationality needed to pursue the purpose with efficiency. 45  
 The environment of the Naval Intelligence organization consists of both internal 
and external elements.  The Naval Intelligence organization is embedded into the U.S. 
Navy’s much larger organization.  The Naval Intelligence organization continues to 
change and adapt to meet the demands of Naval Operations around the globe.  The 
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external environment that Naval Intelligence must deal with is the geopolitical, military, 
and international events around the globe that present an uncertain environment for Naval 
Operations.   
 According to organization theory, the Naval Intelligence organization manages 
both internal and external uncertainty in order to best achieve its purpose.  As Posen 
states, internal uncertainty can be managed by SOPs.  SOPs for the Naval Intelligence 
organization are produced by the organization itself, which is the preferred means 
according to organization theory, or SOPs are given to the organization by the 
overarching organization.  Posen states, “Those with formal authority over the 
organization are a cause of uncertainty.”46  Organization theory also sets forth that once 
military organizations establish SOPs, they are resistant to change them because of the 
potential danger to personnel or mission failure.   
 The Naval Intelligence organization’s primary purpose is to manage external 
uncertainty for the larger Navy Organization.   The Naval Intelligence organization 
manages and reduces external uncertainty by collecting intelligence.  The more 
intelligence that can be gathered through national, regional, or shipboard means, then the 
more effectively the organization can reduce external, or environmental, uncertainty.   
 Other measures to reduce uncertainty for the Naval Intelligence organization 
might include exercises using standard wargames to review and reinforce SOPs and 
support the traditional offensive doctrines of the larger Navy organization.  The Naval 
Intelligence organization’s SOP does include the intelligence requirement for defensive 
intelligence in order to protect the larger offensive organization from attack.  However, 
this doctrine remains one of aerial strikes and naval warfare.   
 Civilian intervention is met with suspicion according to military organization 
theory.  Currently, the 9/11 Commission is working on recommendations for intelligence 
reform.  Organization theory would argue that this civilian intervention may be the only 
effective way to bring older SOPs and doctrines back in line with current national grand 
strategies.  The recommendations of the Commission and how they affect the Naval 
Intelligence organization are yet to be seen. Either plural organization or is 
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 Change in the Naval Intelligence organization is encouraged in order to bring in 
new technologies to support the intelligence collection mission.  However, there remain 
older aspects to the national intelligence system that are slow to change and adapt to the 
new asymmetric and hidden threats.  Doctrine has also been slow to change to meet the 
new threat.  Organization theory points out that if new intelligence technologies are not 
proven or disproven in combat then doctrine is unlikely to innovate accordingly.  
Organization theory suggests that civilian intervention is needed in order to spur 
innovation.  The 9/11 Commission may be trying to do just that.   
C. THE MARINE CORPS INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION 
 The Marine Corps Intelligence organization may be much smaller than the Naval 
Intelligence organization, but still possesses many of the attributes of an organization 
consistent with organization theory.   
The purpose of Marine Corps Intelligence is to provide intelligence to their 
designated Marine Commanding Officer also to reduce uncertainty within the battlespace 
and enhance the decision making advantage for the Marine Corps and ultimately the U.S. 
Armed Forces.   
The people in this organization are Marines.  Marines as an organization represent 
a unique cadre of individuals within the Department of Defense.  Marine Corps 
Intelligence professionals are comprised of Intelligence Officers and enlisted Intelligence 
Analysts.  These professionals remain highly specialized in specific intelligence and 
counterintelligence fields for the first half of their career and generalize later in their 
career.  As with Naval Intelligence, these professionals are highly skilled and specialized 
to accomplish their purpose, but they still are not perfectly rational human beings.  
 The environment of the Marine Corps Intelligence organization also consists of 
both internal and external elements.  The internal elements are derived from specific 
direction by the larger Marine Corps organization.  The external environment that Marine 
Corps Intelligence must deal with is enemy threats and military activity.   
 SOPs for the Marine Corps Intelligence organization are very specific to the 
particular unit for which it was written.  Established Marine Corps SOPs are extremely 




                                                
 Marine Corps Intelligence reduces external uncertainty for their commanding 
officer by collecting intelligence of the battlespace.  Other measures to reduce uncertainty 
for Marine Corps Intelligence include regular exercises to review and reinforce SOPs to 
train new members and enhance warfighting effectiveness.  This organization has been 
established with the purpose of supporting the traditional offensive doctrine of the Marine 
Corps.  This doctrine encompasses close air support, amphibious warfare, raids, and land 
warfare.   
 Change in the Marine Corps Intelligence organization comes slowly.  Marine 
Corps doctrine has traditionally been slow to change.  Civilian intervention to spur 
innovation would not be well received.   
D. A NAVY AND MARINE CORPS INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION 
 
 Clearly, based upon organization theory, it is in the best interests of both 
organizations to innovate and transform on their own even though this would result in a 
period of uncertainty for both Intelligence organizations and their respective services.47 
According to organization theory these organizations have within them, exclusively, the 
specialists needed to advise and innovate in a way that could be beneficial to the entire 
organization in the long run.  If left to civilian intervention, both organizations may not 
get what they would want. 
 Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence integration is a course set out in the Naval 
Operating Concept for Joint Operations to provide innovation and a course correction for 
both the Navy and the Marine Corps Intelligence organizations.  Organization theory may 
offer some insights into what an integrated Navy and Marine Corps organization might 
look like and perform.     
The purpose of this integrated organization would be to provide intelligence for a 
specified Naval or Joint Taskforce to reduce uncertainty within the battlespace in the air, 
on and under the sea, and over the land to include all terrain types and climates.  The goal 
of this integrated team would be to greatly enhance the decision making advantage for all  
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U.S. Armed Forces.  They would accomplish this by interfacing with various national, 
theater, shipboard, and ashore assets to produce a tailored, useful product to all the 
warfighters.   
The people in this organization are both Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence 
professionals with perhaps intelligence representatives from the other services.  Although 
they would remain highly specialized, they would work more closely together to improve 
Joint performance.  Organization theory may underscore that human beings are not 
rational, but an integrated organization may be able to overcome the shortcomings of 
individual organizations by reviewing each other’s SOPs and intelligence operations. 
This still may not be entirely efficient, but it would improve the effectiveness of the Navy 
and Marine Corps Intelligence Team in accomplishing their combined purpose.48  
 The environment of this Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Organization will 
still consist of both internal and external elements.  The internal environment would 
continue to remain a challenge as long as the larger Navy and Marine Corps 
organizations remain independent and suspicious of one another.  The external 
environment would be less of a problem since there would be an increase in intelligence 
sharing and manpower to collect on various geopolitical, military, and international 
events.   
 SOPs and doctrine for both Naval Intelligence and Marine Corps Intelligence 
would have to be rewritten by the organizations themselves.  SOPs would only have to be 
rewritten to the degree that it accommodates integration.  This would reduce the 
uncertainty of having another organization without the expertise to write it for them.  
There will be a transition period where there may be a potential danger to personnel or 
mission failure, but a new, well drafted SOP and accompanying doctrine will prove to 
bring more success than failure in the Global War on Terrorism.   
 This integrated Intelligence organization’s primary purpose would still try to 
manage the vast external uncertainty in warfare.  More intelligence can be gathered by an 
integrated Intelligence organization than by one organization acting alone.   
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 Exercises and wargames that integrate Navy and Marine Corps warfighting 
elements more effectively would reinforce the need for further integration for new 
offensive doctrines against asymmetric threats.  This new offensive doctrine should 
combine the attributes of both forces to bring multiplied capabilities to the battlespace to 
include: aerial strikes, close air support, naval warfare, amphibious warfare, raids ashore, 
and land warfare.   
 Civilian intervention is met with suspicion according to military organization 
theory.  If civilian intervention can be avoided by initiatives within these Intelligence 
organizations then the resulting integrated products will be more in line for what is 
needed by this integrated organization.  If these initiatives fail or are not implemented, 
then civilian intervention may be the result.  Organization theory states that this approach 
may be the only way to update organizations so they are consistent with grand strategy.49  
The 9/11 Commission is a current example of civilian intervention to enforce grand 
strategy. 
 Technological innovation should remain the norm for this integrated Intelligence 
organization.  New sensor modules and unmanned vehicles promise to be a force 
multiplier in the future.  This integrated organization’s mission would be to adapt to 
asymmetric threats and hunt down and locate terrorist cells and encampments all around 
the globe.  Intelligence doctrine needs to change to meet this new threat as well.  
Organization theory suggests that civilian intervention is needed in order to spur 
innovation.  The goal of this integrated Navy and Marine Corps team would be to 
discourage civilian intervention by enacting policies, procedures, and doctrines on their 
own that would be consistent with the new asymmetric threat around the globe. 
E. CULTURE AS AN INTERVENING VARIABLE IN ORGANIZATION 
THEORY 
 
 There are some alternate points of view to organization theory as to what drives 
organizations to make the decisions they do.  Posen states that military organizations 
make decisions based upon both internal and external uncertainty and how to reduce 
uncertainty in order to accomplish the organization’s purpose.   
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 Elizabeth Kier in her article suggests that military organizations make decisions 
based upon their own cultural constraints and the constraints placed upon them by 
civilian authority and not by factors in the external environment.50  She states that 
military doctrine is a result of longstanding military culture.  She states, “The preferences 
the civilians and the military bring to doctrinal decisions respond to cultural more than to 
structural or functional characteristics.”51  Culture is extremely hard to define, but clearly 
has an impact in the structure of a military organization and its doctrine. 
 Both the Navy and the Marines Corps have a long history of culture and tradition, 
which does influence their behavior.  “The emphasis on ceremony and tradition, and the 
development of a common language and esprit de corps, testify to the strength of the 
military’s organizational culture.”52  Military culture is an important part of the military, 
but in the United States Armed Forces culture does not drive decision making exclusive 
of the uncertainty of the external environment.  The very existence of Navy and Marine 
Corps Intelligence organizations is a testament to the value placed on coping with and 
adapting to external uncertainty in the military.   
 Culture applies in Posen’s organizational theory in the casual force of people.  
People remain imperfect and influenced by the behavior of others and by their military 
organization’s particular and proud culture.  It is within the people that culture, whether 
good or bad, influences organizations. 
 Cultural barriers do stand in the way of Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence 
integration.  Acceptance of cultural differences is a step in the right direction.  There may 
also be measures taken by both the Navy and the Marine Corps as a whole and by the 
Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence organizations to break down cultural barriers.  By 
adopting similar physical fitness standards, fitness reports, and even uniforms, military 
leaders and policy makers may see greater progress being made in the integration of  
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Navy and Marine Corps culture not only in the Intelligence organizations, but service 
wide.  Kier states, “Changing military doctrine is hard, but it is harder still if we neglect 
culture’s role.”53   
 Whereas military culture affects military doctrine, strategic culture affects civilian 
grand strategies.  Alastair Iain Johnston states, “Most of those who use the term culture 
tend to argue, explicitly or implicitly, that different states have different predominant 
strategic preferences that are rooted in the early or formative experiences of the state, and 
are influenced to some degree by the philosophical, political, cultural, and cognitive 
characteristics of the state and its elites.”54   
 American culture drives civilian oversight and policymakers to intervene or to not 
intervene into the affairs of the military.  If the U.S. military commits an act that is 
outside of American strategic culture then swift action will be taken.  Again, culture 
drives behavior, but it remains impossible to quantify how much impact culture really has 
regarding decision making in either the military or civilian realm.55  There is and will 
remain tension in civil-military relations based upon culture and organization.  Johnston 
states, “There is considerable evidence in anthropology and social psychology that the 
construction of group identities involves the creation of in-group- out-group tensions.”56   
 Culture is something to be acknowledged as a factor in decision making, 
nevertheless it should not remain a hindrance to progress, innovation, or transformation.  
Military organizations should not become victims of culture especially in warfare.  
Culture should be accepted, accommodated, and should remain a factor in policy making 
and decision making for American policy and military doctrine.  As Colin S. Gray states, 
“The proposition of extra-culturality is ridiculous.”57  Culture as well as doctrine needs to 
change and adapt to the transforming threat to be effective.   
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 The integration of Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence organizations must take 
into account culture, but it should not be driven by culture or allow cultural barriers to 
persist between Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence organizations whether at sea or 
ashore.  Winning the Global War on Terrorism will require a Joint effort from all of the 




























V. APPLYING THE NEW MODEL TO THE THREAT 
ENVIRONMENT 
 
A. THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR   
An integrated Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence organization is also essential 
for responding to the Global War on Terror.  Terrorist cells have demonstrated that they 
can endanger the lives of innocent Americans around the globe and now within the 
United States.  Terrorists can inflict enough carnage with conventional weapons and 
explosives alone.  Terrorist cells with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) present a 
nightmarish future for American citizens as well as the whole world.  Americans would 
live in a world in which they would never feel safe again.  The Department of Defense is 
aware of this potential danger to the United States and its citizens and has endeavored 
with other departments and agencies to take measures to ensure the safety of Americans 
all over the globe.   
Intelligence has come to the forefront as the critical enabler for the Global War on 
Terror campaign.  The United States has been forced to adopt a doctrine of preemptive 
strikes and raids on individual terrorists and terrorist encampments to prevent further 
terrorist attacks.   
U.S. forces have the capability to attack these terrorist cells, but lack the specific 
intelligence required and the legal authority to initiate a campaign.  The U.S. intelligence 
analyst is skilled in the analysis phase of the process.  What is missing is a robust and 
focused collection system.  There is a need for greater funding to improve intelligence 
collection capabilities. 
B. OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM AND OPERATION IRAQI 
FREEDOM   
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) taught the United States that it could not 
always count on allies to provide airfields and ground support to American forces.  The 
Navy and the Marine Corps were ready to respond to the task at hand by projecting 
power over 800 miles inland from the sea with tactical aircraft and Marines on the 





                                                
matter of days.  The Marines established a foothold at Camp Rhino in Southern 
Afghanistan.  OEF demonstrated to the world the combined combat power of the Navy 
and Marine Corps Team. 
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) further demonstrated the value of Naval forces as 
Turkey and Saudi Arabia denied their airfields to U.S. Air Force aircraft.  Carrier-based 
aircraft engaged in strikes in Iraq along with ship launched TLAMs.  Meanwhile, a 
Marine Expeditionary Force invaded Iraq along with the Army in a coordinated assault.  
Again, the Navy and Marine Corps Team answered the call of the United States. 
Marine Corps Intelligence did have success with HET coordination and Dragon 
Eye organic UAV support during OIF.  Nevertheless, tactical commanders in OIF still 
lacked the resolution and clarity they needed from intelligence.  Many of these problems 
came from their lack of clout to request tasking of national and theater intelligence 
collection assets.  Finally, information overload continued to be a problem.58  Small, 
tactical Marine units ashore have the capacity to receive only relevant, actionable 
intelligence into their decision maker’s user defined interface.  FORCEnet will have the 
capability to provide this tailored intelligence to an integrated Navy and Marine Corps 
Intelligence organization.   
OEF and OIF still represented conventional-type wars against conventional forces 
with the exception of the labyrinth of caves in Afghanistan.  The Global War on Terror 
has only begun, but the days of conventional campaigns is coming to an end.  The Global 
War on Terror is moving to target the greater and more elusive threat from non-state 
actors.  Not all these terrorist groups can be destroyed through conventional means.  
What is needed is intensive intelligence combined with a small, highly accurate strike 
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C. THE ROAD TO VICTORY 
1. Pulling Resources and Skills Together 
The Navy and the Marine Corps can pull together their intelligence collection 
assets.  The Navy and the Marine Corps should continue their development of organic 
intelligence collectors in the form of unmanned vehicles equipped with various sensor 
modules to augment theater and national intelligence collection assets.  Organic, sea-
going intelligence collectors will aid in the meticulous collection of a particular target of 
a strike or raid.  Organic collectors will also aid in the overall ISRT capability and 
mission flexibility of the maritime forces.  Finally, organic collection assets will be 
essential in real-time, FORCEnet operations.  
2. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace 
As the pace of campaigns increases, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace 
(IPB) will have to be thorough before the conflict and be able to be rapidly adapted 
during the execution phase of the campaign.  Although theater Joint Intelligence Centers 
can assist in this preparation process, deployed Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence 
Professionals will be responsible to their commanders for the final product.   
The IPB has to be detailed enough for the single Marine on the ground and broad 
enough for the entire campaign.  If the Navy and the Marine Corps Team is to retain the 
decision advantage, the information advantage, and the force advantage, then the 
operational tempo calls for continuous operations as well as continuous adaptation.  This 
can only be fully achieved with an integrated Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence 
organization.  A thorough IPB will become even more essential as the tempo of the 
campaign is increased by FORCEnet concepts. 
3. The Need for Cooperation with Special Warfare 
Navy SEALs and other U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) will continue to 
contribute to this new campaign.  Their expertise in night operations, intelligence, and 
strike will be indispensable.  Special Operations Forces remain a small, specialized force 
and need conventional force augmentation during the Global War on Terrorism.  The 
traditional SOF missions will not go by the wayside, but will go to the Marine Corps.  




                                                
potential to assume many of the Special Operations missions.  MEU(SOC)s can also 
work in conjunction with SEALs and other SOF units for larger operations.59
Integrated Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence will provide the intelligence 
needed for these operations using the sea base and FORCEnet.  For example, Marine 
Corps Intelligence has the ability not only to support the needs of the Marine Corps, but 
also to the U.S. Navy SEALs to some degree.  SEALs require ground specific 
intelligence that is more akin to Marine Corps Intelligence resources.    
4. The Importance of the Expeditionary Strike Group   
The ESG has a much more accurate ground intelligence picture by virtue of the 
intelligence assets they have onboard.  An integrated Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence 
Team onboard an ESG can provide the warfare commander and the regional combatant 
commander detailed ground intelligence.   
This detailed intelligence is developed using a concept called layered ISRT.60  
The ESG can direct their intelligence assets towards a particular terrorist group as 
directed by the Combatant Commander.  The ESG can send their P-3 forward to collect 
imagery of the terrorist encampment and collect signals intelligence.  The ESG Staff 
Intelligence Officer can interface with national intelligence agencies to provide further 
details of the terrorist group and encampment.   
The ESG can then send additional assets to collect additional intelligence.  The 
ESG’s submarine could be sent forward to collect imagery of the coastline and collect 
additional SIGINT.  Each layer of intelligence provides further detail and the combatant 
commander can decide to collect additional layers of intelligence. 
Meanwhile the ESG is moving into strike position with its range of strike assets to 
attack the terrorist encampment.  The submarine deployed forward can release its SEAL 
team via the Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS).  SEAL teams inserted onto the 
ground can use intelligence gathered so far to locate the terrorist encampment and then 
report to the ESG commander.   
If the encampment is too big or too well defended for the SEALs to attack, then 
the ESG commander can use the embarked MEU(SOC) of Marines to attack the terrorist 
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encampment.  Marine Corps Intelligence through R&S teams, HUMINT exploitation 
teams, or SIGINT teams may enter the battlespace to assist SEAL team reconnaissance.  
The ultimate goal is to provide the best IPB for the MEU(SOC).   
The MEU(SOC) rapid response planning process (R2P2) will be underway with 
the detailed IPB provided by integrated Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence.  A raid 
conducted by Marines or SEALs are usually the most effective means of combat against a 
non-state actor like a terrorist group.  Intelligence support must be intensive for these 
operations in preparation for the raid, during the raid, and the resulting debrief.   
Naval Intelligence assets like the P-3, the FLIR equipped MH-60R, the surface 
combatants and the submarine will monitor the operation.  The intelligence collections 
officer can also employ theater UAVs and other theater level collection assets through 
requests for information to the theater Joint Intelligence Center.   
When it is time for the actual raid, the ESG commander will be present in the 
Joint Operations Center (JOC) onboard the LHA or LHD with an integrated Navy and 
Marine Corps Intelligence watch within the JOC.  The Navy and Marine Corps Team can 
provide the commander the joint intelligence picture in detail in order to support the raid.  
The Naval Intelligence Officer will provide the commander the intelligence picture from 
the surrounding Naval Intelligence assets as well as theater assets.  The Marine 
Intelligence Officer will provide the commander the detailed ground picture as the raid 
occurs as well as providing updated intelligence to the Marines on the ground.61
A successful raid will likely to ensue because of integrated, layered ISRT that 
thoroughly prepared the battlespace prior to the attack.  An intelligence debrief of the 
Marines as well as captured enemy forces will provide additional, invaluable intelligence 
for future operations.  In this way, layered, integrated intelligence provides the best 









                                                
5. Enhancing Carrier Strike Group Accuracy 
The CSG is extremely capable at strike warfare on a large, conventional scale.  
Extremely precise and accurate weapons are needed for the Global War of Terror. 
Weapon yields may actually need to be reduced to create the desired effect.62  Marine 
Corps Intelligence Professionals have the ability to provide the much needed ground 
picture for carrier-based strikers and for CSAR.  All airwings should have at least one 
Marine Corps hornet squadron onboard.  This would guarantee the presence of needed 
Marine Corps ground analysts in the CVIC. 
CSGs, that are tasked to attack terrorist encampments, could also adopt a similar, 
layered ISR capability to improve precision strike.  CSGs already use national and theater 
collection assets to support strikes including P-3s and UAVs.  SHARPS-equipped F/A-
18F Super Hornets can conduct reconnaissance over a target encampment and feed that 
imagery back to the CSG’s CVIC.  The CSG submarine and surface combatants can also 
provide SIGINT and IMINT of the target zone.   
The CSG can request a SEAL team to support the operation from Special 
Operations Command.  The SEAL team can be inserted into the target area using the 
Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS) from the submarine like the ESG.  The SEAL 
team can conduct intelligence on the terrorist encampment for the CSG commander as 
well.   
The CSG, however, does not have the option of using the MEU as raiders.  
However, the CSG can do combined arms warfare using SEAL intelligence on the 
ground.  The SEALs in coordination with an air strike from the CSG can employ 
precision warfare against a terrorist encampment.   
Additionally, the CSG could consider carrying a contingent of Marines onboard 
the carrier for small raids against terrorist cells.  This platoon of Marines could be special 
operations capable and trained to provide ground intelligence in the form of HUMINT, 
SIGINT, and R&S for IPB.  Again, detailed IPB is essential for high precision strike 
warfare including close air support (CAS).  
 




The Marine platoon could coordinate with ground forces ashore to ensure that 
carrier-based aircraft could provide the best CAS possible in a ground campaign.  Finally, 
a Marine platoon with the CSG could provide force protection for the strike group. 
Again, an integrated Navy and Marine Corps Team provides better intelligence, greater 
strike options, and better support to the warfare commander during the Global War on 
Terrorism. 
6. Organic Unmanned Vehicles are Indispensable 
Both ESGs and CSGs could benefit from an organic unmanned vehicle (UV) 
capability.  Ship-based UVs, configured with the correct sensor module, would be 
directed by the strike commander of the battlespace and operated by the Intelligence 
Officer.  These UVs would be able to provide a stare capability over the target area for 
campaign execution and bomb hit assessments.  UVs can also act as communications 
relays, SIGINT collectors, and target designators for attackers. 
Some UVs will be able to carry weapons modules as well in support of a strike or 
a raid.  Finally, aircraft could be equipped with small expendable wingtip UAVs to scan 
the target area, get target confirmation, and receive real-time bomb hit assessments.  
These wingtip UAVs would be small enough to be easily transportable.  It would also 
small enough to avoid enemy air defenses and be able to fly low over the target area.  
These wingtip UAVs could even be gliders.  It could be equipped with a small camera 
and be remote controlled by either the pilot or naval flight officer.     
Small Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs) can be launched from submarines 
and surface vessels as easily as a torpedo.  They would also be equipped with various 
oceanic sensor modules to collect on a broad spectrum of surface, air, subsurface, and 
even land-based threats and potential targets of opportunity.   
7. Employing the Sea Base 
Through the Sea Basing concept CSGs and ESGs can come together to form a 
larger sea base from which to launch operations against larger terrorist strongholds or 
even state level actors.  The sea base would be an extremely powerful and scalable 
platform from which to launch a major campaign.  Command of the sea base could be 
given to the ESG commander, the CSG commander, or to a sea based Joint Task Force 




The ESG could provide the detailed ground intelligence for the sea base and then 
move Marine ground forces ashore.  The CSG could provide the striking power for larger 
operations or campaigns.  When combined together, this force can project power ashore 
through combined arms warfare.  Aircraft can support ground forces, destroy air 
defenses, destroy enemy ground forces, and enemy command and control.  While this 
part of the campaign is being executed, SEALs on the ground can collect additional 
intelligence and conduct smaller raids.  Essentially, this sea base has the potential to 
project power ashore using various forms of combat in unison.  This represents the 
optimization of combined arms warfare.  From the sea base, the JTF commander is truly 
at the operational level of warfare. 
The only way effective intelligence support can be provided to this intricate level 
of warfare on the sea base is through a sophisticated, afloat intelligence center that 
integrates Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence organizations at sea.  As forces become 
more and more dependent upon detailed intelligence for strikes and raids, it is clear that 
only a combined effort will truly answer the requirements of the warfare commander and 
the theater Combatant Commander.  
D. COUNTERPROLIFERATION   
1. Stopping WMD Smuggling on the High Seas 
An integrated Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Team should not just be 
applied to attacking terrorist encampments throughout the world.  The possibilities for 
faster, more accurate intelligence from integration are limitless.  Another area of 
application is stopping the spread of weapons of mass destruction from both rogue states 
and non-state actors, who support terrorist groups.   
The United States has made it a priority for the various intelligence agencies to 
report and track WMD programs and possible smuggling after September 11, 2001. 
While various government agencies are doing an effective job on counterproliferation, 
the Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence organization can enhance U.S. 
Counterproliferation efforts through detection and then the Navy and Marine Corps can 




2. Detection of WMD 
The Navy and the Marine Corps together can help stem WMD proliferation 
through various capabilities.  The first is the intelligence collection on and evaluation of 
suspected WMD sites and the vessels that may be transferring them.   
The first capability is derived from the intelligence collection abilities of the Navy 
and the Marine Corps.  As ESGs and CSGs are deployed around the globe, they add to 
the eyes and ears of the U.S. Government.  They can provide intelligence from 
intercepted signals, they can conduct human intelligence on the ground, they can use 
organic imagery assets, and finally, they could uncover WMD programs while engaged in 
a raid ashore or while conducting reconnaissance for an operation.   
It is this intensive, afloat intelligence collection capability that has been lacking in 
the past.  As U.S. Naval forces become more proactive around the globe during the 
Global War on Terrorism, they will have the opportunity more and more to assist in 
counterproliferation efforts.   
Counterproliferation operations require the same range of intelligence assets used 
in counterterrorism operations.  The layered ISRT approach used to track terrorist cells is 
suitably intricate and thorough enough for tracking and locating rogue WMD labs and 
storage sites.  The ESG does this well, but this type of operation could also be 
accomplished by the Marine Corps equipped CSG or Surface Action Group (SAG). 
The Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) tries to track merchant ships around the 
world that may be transporting WMD and other illegal arms to rogue states or terrorist 
groups who plan to use them.  This has been a mission of ONI for years, but has recently 
had renewed attention given the Global War on Terrorism.  The CSGs and ESGs at sea 
can augment this tracking by using their various means of integrated intelligence 
collection.  In addition, the port facilities of the world are monitored for suspicious 
containers and cargo by human intelligence.   
3. Interdiction 
The next step is taking the appropriate action on the intelligence provided from 
both Navy and Marine Corps intelligence resources.  The Navy and the Marine Corps 




Marines can raid a suspected compound to seize the weapons, destroy production 
facilities, capture the scientists, or attack the perpetrators. 
In addition, the Navy and the Marine Corps can conduct Maritime Interception 
Operations (MIOs) on merchant vessels suspected of transporting WMD from one rogue 
state to another or to a terrorist group.  The Surface Action Group (SAG) is the best-
suited strike group to assume this type of mission.  Again, the SAGs would benefit from a 
Marine Detachment (MARDET) onboard with their associated Marine Corps Intelligence 
personnel to augment Navy 3905 support onboard.  This MARDET would conduct 
opposed boarding operations like the SEAL teams. 
These vessels can be stopped by SAGs and boarded by Marines or SEALs and 
searched.  If weapons are found they will be seized.  The ship will then be impounded 
and the crew detained.  In this way, the Navy and the Marine Corps can assist in 
preventing the proliferation of WMD around the world.     
E. DEALING WITH ANTI-ACCESS ENVIRONMENTS   
1. Jungles, Forests, and Swamps 
An integrated Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Team would give both 
services a better capability for operating in austere environments ranging from the jungle 
to a city or town.   
In the jungles, forests, and swamps of the world, Marine Corps R&S teams on the 
ground have the capability to see and hear what national and theater sensors cannot.  
HUMINT exploitation teams can use tips from the CIA or the State Department to obtain 
leads on terrorist camp locations and then set out to locate the exact position for a follow-
on strike or raid.  Seismic sensors and ground SIGINT collectors around a possible 
encampment will only augment this capability.  FORCEnetted teams on the ground 
collecting intelligence will provide the ground picture for the follow-on force.   
The Navy can support these operations through several means.  Land basing of 
forces in these environments is problematic for computer systems, support, and facilities 
for personnel.  Additionally, the jungle environment offers poor force protection options 
for forces on the ground.   Sea based forces will have the necessary support facilities 




Strikes from the sea into these environments can be in the form of raids by 
Marines, SEALs, or air strikes from ship-based aircraft, gunfire, or TLAMs.  Using Sea 
Strike with Marine Corps Intelligence support will add precision to air strikes that 
otherwise could not hit targets under the this ground cover.  Intelligence tied to 
operations will provide speed, relevancy, and accuracy to raids ashore, and culminate into 
optimized combined arms warfare.   
2. The Urban Environment 
Within the urban environments, the value of Marine Corps Intelligence is even 
more apparent.  Marine Corps HUMINT teams can infiltrate a city long before the strike 
group arrives offshore to assist other governments in tracking and locating terrorist 
elements within the cities.  Once these terrorist elements have been located using 
HUMINT, SIGINT, and IMINT collection, then plans can be made for highly accurate 
naval strikes and raids from the strike group.   
In urban combat, strikes and raids have to be extremely precise to reduce any 
chance of collateral damage to other buildings and to reduce the possibility of injuring 
innocent bystanders.  Raids should also be fast and covert to avoid casualties.  Intensive 
intelligence gathering again through layered ISRT will aid in these types of operations.  
This approach maximizes the capability for the strike group to maneuver into a 
region, project power ashore quickly, and leave a small footprint of forces ashore before, 
during, and after an operation.  This type of sea based maneuver warfare requires few 
forces, precision strike, and highly intensive intelligence collection during all phases of 
the campaign.  This intensive intelligence collection can only become a reality by 
integrating Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence organizations.  
Strike groups will maintain escalation dominance through the sea basing concept 
for almost any contingency.  CSAR forces will be standing by to support strikes and raids 
ashore.  In addition, ESGs have an entire MEU available to send ashore in case of 
escalation.  CSGs have an entire airwing of strike aircraft available for an operation.  
FORCEnet will easily integrate additional forces to the sea base as necessary.  All of 
these operations will continue to call upon an adaptable, flexible, integrated Navy and 




The Global War on Terrorism is so vast in scale that other agencies cannot hope 
to the do the job alone.  The integration of Navy and Marine Corps assets under this 
concept creates a force that is consistent with America’s overall national security 
strategy.  This integrated force would be designed to better interface with other U.S. 
Government agencies and conduct strikes, raids, or other operations consistent with the 































Intelligence will play an increasingly important role in U.S. military operations.  
However, intelligence requirements of the cold war and the post-cold war world will no 
longer suffice to ensure the security of Americans at home and abroad.  Naval 
Intelligence alone does not have the detailed ground picture needed for future conflicts in 
the Global War of Terrorism.  Marine Corps Intelligence does not have the connectivity 
or experience in working on a sea base.  Only an integrated Navy and Marine Corps will 
bring those capabilities to the 21st Century battlespace.  CNO Tasker #65, will bring 
about a process of integration that will prove to be advantageous for both services during 
the Global War on Terror.   
An integrated Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence organization with Naval 
Operations will improve the speed of attack and lethality for both services and the armed 
forces as a whole.  Integrated intelligence will improve strikes and raids in a variety of 
terrains including jungle and urban environments.  Additionally, the sea base will benefit 
from shipboard intelligence systems.   
Naval Power 21 clearly outlines how the sea services can fight more effectively as 
an integrated team through FORCEnet and Network Centric Operations to meet the 
threats of the 21st Century.  This will make them more integrated with the Army and the 
Air Force at the tactical level of warfare, where Joint initiatives are essential. 
 The Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Team will flow intelligence through 
FORCEnet analytical tools.  Near real-time intelligence support to the commander will 
ensure information dominance within the battlespace.  An integrated intelligence picture 
at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of warfare will provide full spectrum 
dominance at every echelon of command.  The horizontal integration of intelligence with 
command and control and operations will be revolutionary in this respect.  Unmanned 
vehicles and Marine Corps Intelligence on the ground will make intelligence integration a 
reality. 
The objective of Navy and Marine Corps integration should be to provide the best 
possible product not only to the commander but also to the warfighter in the air or on the 




warfighter the intelligence he or she needs to strike the right target at the right time with 
the right weapon.  This self-optimization will allow them these organizations to reach 
their objective more efficiently without the need for civilian intervention. 
Integration will require training together in an effort to improve interaction 
between Sailors and Marines.  Again, it is the unique skill sets of each service that make 
them valuable to each other.  Naval Intelligence skills complement Marine Corps 
Intelligence capabilities on the ground.  Ideally, there should be no duplication of effort.   
Integration calls for a greater cultural and functional understanding on how the 
other organization operates and what they can bring to accomplishing the mission 
objective.  This can be accomplished by bringing those service members together on the 
ships, in the staffs at sea and ashore, and provide greater opportunities for interservice 
training in the schoolhouses and during exercises.   
The Global War on Terrorism calls for smaller, faster forces that rely heavily 
upon highly accurate intelligence to find the elusive threat.  With the limitations of 
national assets, the Navy and the Marine Corps can pull together their intelligence 
resources and skills to improve overall maritime force performance.   
Sea-based intelligence collectors tasked by intelligence professionals in support of 
operations is part of the new paradigm.  Unmanned vehicles and their associated sensor 
modules remain essential to locate terrorist cells in austere, anti-access environments.  A 
FORCEnetted sea base with a real-time common operating picture fed by organic and 
national intelligence sensors will provide operators on the ship, in the air and on the 
ground with essential intelligence in the future.   
The ultimate goal of Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence integration is winning 
the Global War on Terrorism and confronting the future threats to the United States.  This 
is a goal shared by every member of the U.S. Armed Forces.  The intelligence skills of 
each service will prove to bring greater, overall strength an integrated maritime force.  
Admiral Clark and General Hagee assert that Navy and Marine Corps integration is 
essential in Naval Transformation and winning the Global War on Terrorism.  Progress at 
sea on the CSGs and the ESGs is occurring right now and promise to pave the way for a 





The Navy and the Marine Corps need to capitalize on the strengths of their 
differences while eliminating the weaknesses within their organizations.  This will result 
in an optimized combined arms force that will provide a full spectrum of capabilities to 
the Combatant Commander and greater options for the President as the United States 
enters the 21st Century.  An integrated Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence organization 
promises to be the cornerstone of such endeavors.  Through integration initiatives, the 
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